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Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose (mandatory) The purpose of this research is to make visible the relationship 
between accounting and stigma in the absence of accounting.  
This research examines how failure to implement mandatory 
accounting and auditing requirements in the management of 
Indigenous wages contributed to stigmatisation of Indigenous 
Australians and led to maladministration and unchecked financial 
fraud that continued for over 75 years.  The accounting failures 
were by those charged with protect the financial interests of the 
Indigenous population. 
Design/methodology/approach (mandatory) An historical and qualitative approach has been used that draws 
upon archival and contemporary sources. 
Findings (mandatory) Prior research has examined the nexus between accounting 
mechanisms and stigma.  This research suggests that the 
absence of accounting mechanisms can also contribute to 
stigma. 
Research limitations/implications (if 
applicable) 
This research highlights the complex relationship between 
accounting and stigma, suggesting that it is simplistic to examine 
the nexus between accounting and stigma without considering 
the social forces in which stigmatisation occurs. 
Social implications (if applicable) This research demonstrates decades of failed accounting have 
contributed to the ongoing social disadvantage of Indigenous 
Australians.  The presence of accounting mechanisms cannot 
eradicate the past, or fix the present but create an environment 
where financial abuse does not occur.  
Originality/value (mandatory) This research demonstrates that stigma can be exacerbated in 
the negative space created by failures or absence of accounting. 
 
 
Keywords: Aborigines, accounting history, Indigenous Australians, stigma, stolen wages 
 
Introduction 
For countless years Aborigines were employed as housemaids, nannies, cooks and 
drovers – we thought our money was being “saved”. 
But governments used Aboriginal money to fund developments and no “savings” were 
left over. 
How dare they take our land, use our labour and then spend our hard-earned money! 
Did this degrading and stealthy practice occur within their white society? 
If it happened to them recompense would have been immediately. 
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For so-called compensation they are offering a lousy $4000 
Is the oldest culture really worth that much? 
Why are Aborigines still living in increasing squalor? 
If Australia is such a “lucky” country, why is government’s “compensation” offer so very 
paltry? (Cassidy, 2005). 
In 2010 the State Government of Queensland, Australia offered compensation of $4000 to each 
Indigenous worker who could demonstrate, with a level of proof acceptable at law, that their past wages 
had been “stolen” by the government.  The term “stolen wages” refers to the denial of access of 
Indigenous Australian workers to their wages (Rudd, 2008).  Since this term has been used in 
government inquiries in Australia (Government of Victoria, 2009; Queensland Government, 2010) and 
has entered the vernacular, we adopt this term throughout this research.  Our research examines stolen 
wages between 1897 and 1972 because this matches the period covered by government inquiries into 
this practice even though these abuses are known to have occurred prior, and subsequent, to this 
period (Kidd, 2007).  The total period during which this abuse occurred is not known due to the 
inadequacy of accounting records (Government of Victoria, 2009). 
The poem that commences this research is a response by Indigenous Australian Coralie Cassidy to the 
Queensland Government’s offer of compensation.  The title of her poem Lousy Little Offer alludes to a 
documentary film entitled Lousy Little Sixpence (A. Morgan & Bostock, 1983), which was one of the first 
attempts to bring stolen wages to wider public attention in Australia.  When the Queensland Government 
announced its offer of compensation, it simultaneously acknowledged that no-one would meet the 
evidentiary burden of proof required to claim compensation because government accounting records 
on stolen wages varied from poor to non-existent.  The Queensland Government acknowledged that 
this was not due to its failure to preserve the records but rather, a failure to make adequate accounting 
records and, when records had been kept, an intentional practice of misinformation (Department of 
Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2010).  Only those whose wages had 
been stolen were entitled to claim a compensation payment even though most Indigenous workers 
whose wages had been stolen were no longer living. 
Indigenous wages have become a political issue in every jurisdiction except Australia’s island state of 
Tasmania (Kinnane, Harrison, & Reinecke, 2015; Lino, 2010).  The Palawa people were the Indigenous 
tribe living in Tasmania at the time of white settlement.  Following forcible transportation in the early 
1800s to a small island off the Tasmanian coast, most died from malnutrition or disease (Elder, 2003). 
This research uses a case study of Indigenous stolen wages to enhance understanding of the 
relationship between accounting and stigma.  Stigma occurs when a person or group is rejected by or 
not fully accepted into society (Goffman, 1974).  Prior research has considered how the use of 
accounting mechanisms can create, support or maintain stigma (Neu & Wright, 1992; Walker, 2008) 
and also, how the use of accounting mechanisms can alleviate or remove stigma (Miley & Read, 2016).  
In this research, we demonstrate that the failure of accounting mechanisms can also create, support or 
maintain stigma.  The choices made in accounting create reality (Hines, 1988).  We would extend this: 
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the silences where accounting does not exist, or has failed, also create reality.  In the case of stolen 
wages, that reality caused ongoing financial hardship to, and stigmatisation of, Australia’s Indigenous 
population (Haebich, 1992), a group already stigmatised through ethnicity and poverty (Kowal, 2011; 
Peel, 2003).  Choudhury (1988, p. 549) uses the term “negative space” to refer inter alia to silences due 
to a lack of accounting mechanisms in areas where we would expect to find accounting. 
The role of accounting in creating, supporting or maintaining stigma has been a recurring research 
theme (McKinley, Ponemon, & Schick, 1996; Miley & Read, 2016; Neu & Wright, 1992; Ó hÓgartaigh, 
Ó hÓgartaigh, & Tyson, 2012; Walker, 2008).  Although not explicitly dealing with stigma, much of the 
research on (ab)uses of accounting control mechanisms by one group to dominate another could be 
reconstructed as uses of accounting mechanisms to reinforce stigma (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 
2009; Neu, 2000; Oldroyd, Fleischman, & Tyson, 2008; Tyson, Oldroyd, & Fleischman, 2005).  Outside 
the sphere of accounting, stigma has been cast both as a form of social control and the result of social 
control mechanisms (Room, 2005; Stafford & Scott, 1986).  This suggests that to the extent accounting 
is a mechanism of social control, it can potentially cause stigma.  This is not to say that all accounting 
control mechanisms cause stigma or even that all accounting control mechanisms have negative 
impacts (Holden, Funnell, & Oldroyd, 2009).  Social dynamics can complicate study of the impact of 
accounting on stigma (Ó hÓgartaigh et al., 2012): both sociology (Falk, 2001) and accounting (Ó 
hÓgartaigh et al., 2012) have recognised the difficulties associated with attempting to understand 
stigma and the mechanisms that stigmatise.  Unparceling stigma will always be problematic because it 
is an attempt at a static view of a dynamic problem: stigma rarely applies equally to all members of a 
stigmatised group, and both the degree of stigmatisation and the composition of stigmatised groups are 
ever-changing (Goldson, 2002).  To circumvent the difficulties of applying a static view of stigma to a 
problem whose parameters are shifting, we examine an historical example.  The case of stolen wages 
was selected because the failure of accounting mechanisms has been verified through a series of 
government inquiries in Australia (Austin, 1992; Brennan, 2006; Queensland Government, 2010; Rudd, 
2008; Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006). 
Historical reseach methods are appropriate to this field of reseach because stigma becomes entrenched 
with long-lasting negative impacts so is best viewed through an historical lens (Cole, 2009) despite the 
ever-present risk with historical research that attempting to understand the past using a contemporary 
mind-set may lead to misinterpretation.  We do not believe bringing a contemporary mind-set to the 
historical examination of Indigenous wage management creates an obstacle to this research since our 
aim is not to understand why the Indigenous population was stigmatised by the white population in 
Australia.  Instead, we acknowledge the stigmatisation of the Indigenous population but seek to 
understand how that stigma was supported and reinforced by the failure of accounting mechanisms. 
Underlying stigma research in accounting is the assumption that accounting is not mere inscription or 
a purely calculative practice but a mechanism that can impact on society (Hopwood, 1987; G. Morgan, 
1988; Vollmer, 2003).  This assumption is implicit in the stigma research of Walker (2008).  His research 
illustrated the potential of the processing, recording, classification and communication inherent in 
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accounting to stigmatise paupers seeking poor relief in Victorian England.  Through accounting 
practices that degraded the poor, Walker (2008) demonstrated that management of both the poor and 
poor relief were made more difficult.  Stigmatisation confers labels on people, spoiling their identities, a 
term that refers to the disqualification of the stigmatised from full acceptance into society (Goffman, 
1974).  Labelling can create stigma (Goffman, 1974).  To illustrate this, Goffman (1974) presents an 
example of societies unaccepting of homosexuality.  He notes that in such societies, a person who is 
not homosexual, but who is labelled as such, will suffer the same stigma as those who are homosexual.  
Walker (2008) drew on this concept to demonstrate how accounting practices that labelled all poor also 
stigmatised them.  Conversely, Miley and Read (2016) drew on Goffman (1974) to show how accounting 
practices could overcome the spoiling of identities, giving foundling children in eighteenth century 
London an opportunity to gain acceptance by society. 
As with other extant accounting research on stigma, both Walker (2008) and Miley and Read (2016) 
provide example of “positive space”, to use the terminology of Choudhury (1988).  In other words, extant 
research has focused on areas where accounting mechanisms exist.  Choudhury (1988) expresses 
concern with the preoccupation of accounting researchers with the study of the impact of extant 
accounting systems.  He believes that, while the absence of accounting can be viewed simply as the 
antithesis of presence, it can also be considered a phenomenon in its own right.  Choudhury (1988) 
suggests that an examination of voids, or areas where accounting systems either do not operate, or do 
not operate as expected, has the potential to enhance understanding of the nature and function of 
accounting.  Thus, in this research we are attempting to look into a void.  We acknowledge the inherent 
difficulty of this: during each government inquiry into stolen wages, a major evidentiary hurdle was that, 
unlike fraudulent accounting records which leave a visible trail, deliberate accounting failure does not 
leave an evidentiary trail but a gap, and attempting to see the invisible will always be problematic.  
However, we do have one advantage: each of the failures we address in this research was mandated 
directly by legislation or by regulations that had the force of law.  Hence the failures of recording, 
reporting, communicating and auditing that are described in this research were not merely poor 
accounting practice but breaches of law.  These breaches were not prosecuted and now, prosecution 
would not be possible because the time limit under the various State statutes of limitations has expired. 
A complex legal framework has always underpinned the accounting mechanisms supporting stolen 
wages.  This is partly because Australia has state, territorial and federal legal systems.  During some 
of the period covered by our research, over 100 separate pieces of legislation, plus delegated 
legislation, were in operation to manage the Indigenous population (Queensland Public Interest Law 
Clearing House Incorporated, 2006).  Known collectively as the “protection acts”, because their stated 
purpose was Indigenous protection, it is this body of legislation that established the regime for handling, 
and accounting for, Indigenous wages.  During the years covered by our research, many members of 
the white population believed this legislation was for the protection and well-being of the Indigenous 
population and did not recognise the legislation as paternalistic and an affront to Indigenous culture and 
lifestyles (Swan, 1991).  Detailed discussion of the long, and continuing, history of exclusion and 
stigmatisation of the Indigenous population is beyond the scope of this research, although we do provide 
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a brief background.  Conducting this research has been difficult because it has been hard to distance 
ourselves from the magnitude of discriminations and ill treatment suffered by the Indigenous population 
in order to focus on the role of accounting, or rather, its failure. 
To manage this large, complex and politically charged area with its complex plethora of legislation, we 
have made some simplifying assumptions.  We have treated the Indigenous population as a 
homogeneous group.  The reality is that although the protection acts applied to the majority of the 
Indigenous population, some Indigenous Australians remained outside the ambit of this legislation 
because they did not live on land designated as being under the protections acts (eg city dwelling 
Indigenous Australians) or because their ethnically mixed ancestry meant they were not classified as 
“Aboriginal”.  Also, there are examples of Indigenous Australians resisting government controls by 
applying for exemption from the financial control regime, arguing they could manage their own financial 
affairs (Korff, 2012) but these examples are rare and only succeeded if the applicant could prove 
sufficient non-Indigenous ancestors to be reclassed as “white”.  For the purpose of this research, it is 
unnecessary to consider Indigenous sub-groups.  For the sake of simplicity, we usually cite illustrative 
examples of legislative controls taken from a single jurisdiction rather that listing similar legislation from 
all jurisdictions.  We cross-checked legislation from all jurisdictions to ensure our examples were 
representative and not unique to that jurisdiction.  Until 1967, when the Federal Government became 
responsible for Indigenous Affairs, Indigenous legislation was passed at State Government level.  The 
similarity of legislative regimes across all State jurisdictions, including similar failures in the application 
of the accounting controls in the protection acts, suggests isomorphic forces existed in all areas of 
Indigenous management, including Indigenous wages.  In this research, we simplified jurisdictional 
descriptions.  For instance, in 1879 the Queensland Government took legislative control of the Torres 
Strait Islands, situated north of Australia.  Queensland laws periodically required separation of Torres 
Straits Islanders’ wages from those of other Indigenous peoples, although this separation was not 
always maintained (Beattie, 2002).  For the purpose of this research, it is not necessary to consider 
Torres Strait Islander wages separately from mainland Indigenous wages.  We use terms such as 
“Aborigine”, “full-blood” or “half-caste” when they are taken from historical records.  While we use the 
collective terms “Indigenous Australians” or “Indigenous population”, we acknowledge that the 
Indigenous population comprises many distinct groups of peoples, each with their own language, culture 
and history.  Our aim is to simplify terminology, not to offend. 
Aspects of this research have been particularly challenging.  Examining historical records always raises 
issues about their veracity, whether they are representative or isolated examples, and the biases the 
underpin them (Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, & Liamputtong, 2007).  Absence of historical records 
brings additional challenges concerning whether those records were, in fact, ever made or not, and 
which records might have been lost, destroyed or not considered worth preserving.  It is not easy to 
discover what was not; negative spaces, by their very nature, can be voids.  There is also the question 
of reflexivity in research of this kind (Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014).  The accounting 
mechanisms we are examining were set in place by non-Indigenous Australians who have, historically, 
maintained power, and continue to maintain power, over the Indigenous population.  This creates a 
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particular power dynamic, evident in government inquiries into stolen wages: non-Indigenous testimony 
outweighed Indigenous testimony and while most inquiries accepted Indigenous testimony, this was not 
true of all inquiries.  For instance, the inquiry by the State of Victoria only accepted testimony based on 
official, written government records and in doing so, excluded Indigenous testimony (Government of 
Victoria, 2009).  Since there are deficiencies in the written accounting records (Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006), the records become part of the problem and therefore, 
corrupted sources for evidencing that problem.  Although we have incorporated Indigenous testimony 
into this research, we recognise that the oral testimony of a stigmatised group may be devalued and 
may reflect prejudices developed through the process of stigmatisation.  We also acknowledge that we 
are seeking to discuss Indigenous stigmatisation when we are part of the group who have stigmatised.  
Despite these concerns, we believe that the gap between legally mandated accounting requirements 
and accounting practice, as revealed both in documentary evidence and from Indigenous testimony, is 
sufficient to outweigh our concerns. 
In the next section, we provide a background to discrimination against, and stigmatisation of, the 
Indigenous population.  This section sets the context in which the failure of accounting mechanisms in 
the management of Indigenous wages occurred.  This is followed by a description of the accounting 
failures associated with stolen wages.  We conclude with a discussion on how this case study enhances 
our understanding of the nexus between accounting and stigma. 
Background 
The Indigenous population of Aboriginal Australians and Torres Strait Islanders comprises  
approximately 2% of the Australian population or approximately 459,000 people (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2009) and is thought to have lived in Australia for 50,000 years (Elkin, 1964).  From white 
settlement in 1788, this population group suffered institutionalised racism, commencing with Britain 
declaring Australia Terra Nullius, a legal doctrine that translates as “unoccupied territory” and meant 
that only British law was recognised in Australia (Elkin, 1964; Seed, 2007).  Under the doctrine of Terra 
Nullius, neither Indigenous systems to determine rights, obligations and disputes within and between 
tribal groups nor traditional land ownership were recognised by the British colonial administration of 
Australia (Fitzmaurice, 2007): under British law, all land title in Australia came under government control 
(Borch, 2001). 
At settlement, 400 Indigenous Australians lived in the vicinity of Sydney.  Sixty years later, only four 
remained.  The Indigenous population was obliterated by introduced diseases, deliberate slaughter, 
alcoholism and loss of traditional food sources (Elder, 2003).  As white settlement expanded, there was 
a similar impact elsewhere in Australia (Reynolds, 1972).  Some Indigenous Australians resisted 
appropriation of their land by white settlers (H. Pedersen & Woorunmurra, 2011).  The white response 
to this was armed force.  Elder (2003) documents many instances of battles between white settlers and 
Indigenous Australians that invariably led to the slaughter of Indigenous Australians by white settlers, 
police and soldiers.  With few exceptions, governing British authorities considered the Indigenous 
population a problem.  Considered the quintessential “Other”, the Indigenous population was 
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characterised as different and problematic (Elkin, 1964), creating a social climate that ensured 
governments received widespread support for policies and legislation to control Australia’s Indigenous 
population (Hunter, 2000).  Anti-Indigenous discrimination and stigmatisation existed in Australia long 
before the period covered by our research.  A comment made to a newspaper by a juror in the 1838 
trial of twelve non-Indigenous (or “white”) stockmen1 who had rounded up, slaughtered and burnt the 
bodies of twenty-eight Aboriginal women, children and elderly men who were related to their Indigenous 
work colleagues, typifies attitudes of many colonists to Australia’s Indigenous inhabitants: 
I look on the blacks as a sort of monkey and as soon as they are exterminated from the 
face of the earth, the better. I knew the men were guilty but I would never see a white man 
hanged for killing a black (Elder, 2003). 
This event, known as the Myall Creek Massacre, is famous not because of the brutality of the massacre 
but because it was the only time white settlers were tried, convicted and hanged for the slaughter of 
members of the Indigenous population.  Many of the slaughters conducted by European settlers were 
sanctioned by the government authorities or ignored (Elkin, 1964).  Following the Myall Creek 
Massacre, most attacks by European settlers on Indigenous Australians were conducted clandestinely 
and included poisoning food given to Indigenous Australians.  The last documented cases of these 
attacks occurred in the 1920s (Elder, 2003). 
Until the early 1970s, many Indigenous children were taken from their parents and raised in foster 
homes or orphanages, taught to “be white” by methods ranging from encouragement and education to 
physical abuse (National Inquiry into the separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
from their families, 1997).  Taken from their families and culture, these children are now known as the 
“stolen generations”.  Evonne Goolagong-Cawley, born in 1951 and winner of seven women’s singles 
grand slam tennis titles including twice winning Wimbledon, has described her fear as a child of being 
taken from her family ("I used to hide under my bed", 2008).  In 2008, Australia’s Prime Minister 
apologised to the Indigenous population for the stolen generations (Rudd, 2008). 
Indigenous Australians were discouraged from voting in elections (Attwood & Markus, 1998) and 
officials at polling booths could refuse the right to vote to anyone they deemed an “Aboriginal native” 
(Australian Electoral Commission, 2007).  Voting rights for Indigenous and non-indigenous were made 
identical in Australia only as recently as the 1980s (Australian Electoral Commission, 2007). 
White Australian attitudes towards Indigenous Australians have ranged from genocidal to eugenicist, 
assimilationist to benign paternalism (Attwood & Markus, 1998; Gardiner-Garden, 1999).  Each of these 
views has been reflected in the protection acts.  Under the protection acts, each State or Territory had 
a Controller of Aboriginal Affairs who headed a Department of Aboriginal Affairs and established 
protection boards at regional and local level.  The exact titles of boards and controllers varies slightly 
across jurisdictions, and in different time periods, so we have used the most frequently used titles for 
the sake of simplicity.  Controllers at all levels had delegated legislative power to make regulations to 
manage the Indigenous population (Haebich, 1992) and determine all matters pertaining to Indigenous 
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education, employment and welfare ("Aborigines Protection Act (NSW)," 1909).  Indigenous Australians 
could only travel or marry if given written permission from their local protection board.  Protection boards 
also supervised the removal of Indigenous children from their homes to institutions.  The hierarchy of 
boards is shown in figure 1.  Protections boards kept lists of the Indigenous population over whom they 
had control.  In the Northern Territory, the list was officially called the Register of Wards but colloquially 
known as the Stud Book.  The term “stud book” referred to the herd books that graziers kept detailing 
their cattle.  The Register listed the Indigenous population by geographic district, European name, tribal 
or personal name, group, tribe, sex, year of birth, and sub-district: the recorded European name is often 
a disparaging nickname that mocks a physical characteristic rather than a recognisable European name 
(Douglas & Chesterman, 2008).  As examples Nevil Shute (1950: 2009) had Indigenous Australian 
characters nicknamed “moonlight”, “nugget2” and “tarmac” in his novel “A town like Alice”.  Boards did 
not have Indigenous members. 
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of protection boards. 
 
The following section describes both the accounting mechanisms that were in place to support the 
management of Indigenous wages and the failure of those mechanisms.  As previously mentioned, in 
all cases, these mechanisms were not optional but were mandated by law.  Legislation distinguished 
between the responsibility of local and regional protection boards.  Local protection boards held primary 
responsibility for managing Indigenous wages and implementing all protection act requirements within 
their local area.  Regional protection boards did little practical management.  They were primarily 
responsible for explaining regulations and government policy to members of local protection boards, 
State Government 
Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs 
(Controller of 
Aboriginal Affairs)
Regional protection 
board (Regional 
Controller)
Local protection board 
1
(Chief controller 1-
local)
Local protection board 
2
(Chief controller 2 -
local)
Local protection board 
3 etc
(Chief controller 3 etc -
local)
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appointment of local protection board members, collection of information required by State governments 
about the Indigenous population, and such other oversight of local protection boards as they saw fit in 
order to protect the Indigenous population.  In each jurisdiction, the responsibilities of protection boards 
were mandated by law. 
Accounting failures 
Despite an array of recordkeeping requirements contained within the Aborigines legislation 
in other States, problems such as incomplete and complex financial and administrative 
records make it difficult to compile a complete history of an individual’s financial dealings 
with the State, and to prove cases of accounting maladministration (Government of 
Victoria, 2009, p. 3). 
In addition to the finding quoted above, the State Government of Victoria also found that when 
accounting records were unavailable, it was generally because they had never been made.  According 
to this inquiry, maladministration cannot exist if accounting records are not available to prove that 
maladministration.  It is a very odd understanding of the term “maladministration” when absence of 
records required by law, and evidence that those records were never made, is not prima facie proof of 
maladministration.  The inquiry has been criticised, not for this finding but for failing to take testimonial 
evidence from Indigenous Australians (Hartland, Pennycuik, & Barber, 2009).  Although the process of 
inquiry of the State Government of Victoria is questionable, its primary findings matched those of other 
inquiries at State and Federal Government level.  All inquiries found there was a lack of accounting 
records, or records were too incomprehensible to follow, and this was evidence of discriminatory 
disregard for Indigenous financial interests in the management of Indigenous wages (Government of 
Victoria, 2009; Queensland Government, 2010).  In this section, we examine the failure of accounting 
and maladministration in regard to the cash component of Indigenous wages and the component of 
Indigenous wages held in trust.  In this research, evidence of abuses, improprieties and 
maladministration is primarily taken from evidence submitted to, and findings of, government inquiries 
into stolen wages and government-commissioned reports into stolen wages (Brennan, 2006; 
Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2010; Franks, 2006; 
Gardiner-Garden, 1999; Government of Victoria, 2009; Gray, 2008; Greer, 2006; Healey, Brennan, & 
Indigenous Law Centre, 2006; Kidd, 2007; Queensland Government, 2010).  To demonstrate the lack 
of accounting, we include the legal requirements in each area before describing actual accounting 
practices. 
Under the protection acts, protection boards determined the nature and location of work for the 
Indigenous population: there was no freedom of employment and no consultation with Indigenous 
workers (Haebich, 1992).  Up to 75 per cent of Indigenous wages was compulsorily placed into 
government trust accounts.  The remainder was received as cash in hand, called “pocket money”, a 
paternalistic term reserved usually in Australia for small amounts of cash given by parents to children.  
Figure 2 shows an agreement made in 1942 between a local protection board and an employer of 
Indigenous labour.  The document has been damaged over time, as have most of the documents 
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pertaining to Indigenous management that we have viewed.  We speculate that preserving these 
documents may not have been of high priority for protection boards.  In 1942, the average weekly wage 
for all Australian workers was five pounds, 15 shillings and four pence (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1942).  Under the agreement, the Indigenous worker was employed for two pounds per week, receiving 
15 shillings in cash with one pound and five shillings per week deposited into a government trust 
account. 
 
Figure 2: Employment contract between local protection board and employer of an Indigenous worker, showing the 
employee’s pay structure (Julia, 2009). 
 
There is evidence of some jurisdictions varying the amount retained in government trust funds for short 
periods but these changes are negligible.  Neither the reason for these variations nor the choice of 75 
per cent is known (National Inquiry into the separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
from their families, 1997).  We were unable to find any legislation authorising these changes even 
though legislation or gazetted regulations were required that every change to Indigenous management 
("An act for the protection and management of the Aboriginal natives of Victoria (Vic)," 1869).  
Legislation specified the procedure for wages held in trust.  This money was to be deposited in a 
separate bank account which was to be audited annually.  It could not be invested and remained the 
property of the Indigenous wage-earners ("Audit Act (Cth)," 1901; "The Audit Act (Qld)," 1874).  In 
addition to the annual trust account audit, protection acts required regular inspections by protection 
board officers of cash payments.  The frequency of inspections was determined by the Controller of 
Aboriginal Affairs.  In addition, government auditors had power to investigate any suspected financial 
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irregularity ("An Act for the better Examination and Audit of the Public Accounts (SA)," 1862; "Audit Act 
(Cth)," 1901; "Audit Act (NSW)," 1898; "The Audit Act (Qld)," 1874; "Audit Act (Vic)," 1890; "The Audit 
Act (WA)," 1881). 
Cash wages were recorded in a pocket book issued by the local protection board and retained by 
employees.  In the pocket book, employers recorded the date and amount of cash wages paid then 
signed as evidence the payment had been made ("Aborigines Protection Act (NSW)," 1909).  
Indigenous workers were not required to countersign to show receipt of cash.  During the 1940s, 
Queensland government auditors recommended that workers, rather than employers, retain the pocket 
books so visiting protection board officers or audit inspectors could check them at any time.  The 
government responded that Indigenous workers would lose the pocket books and they would be too 
expensive to replace so employers would continue to retain all pocket books, even though there was 
evidence widespread falsification of pocket books by employers (Queensland State Archives SRS 505-
1 Box 196,8.7.49).  This exchange between the government auditors and government is puzzling since 
legislation required that Indigenous employees retain their pocket books.  It suggests neither the 
government nor its auditors were conversant with the main requirements of government legislation.  
Although beyond the scope of this research, we wonder whether auditors were as unfamiliar with 
management of non-Indigenous affairs. 
An inspector appointed by a local protection board was required by law to inspect pocket books at 
regular intervals, generally quarterly, and sign each pocket book with an attestation that it was correct 
(Queensland Department of Health and Home Affairs, 1945, regulations 74 and 75).  Many pocket 
books exist but none has been signed by an inspector (Greer, 2006).  Figure 3 is a letter on behalf of 
an Indigenous worker transferred by to a new place of work, whose pocket book is missing.  Indigenous 
testimony at government inquiries indicates workers could be unjustly accused of losing the pocket 
book when they had never been issued with one, or it had been issued to an employer then, apparently, 
disappeared (Government of Victoria, 2009). 
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Figure 3: Letter from local protection board to the superintendent of Woorabinda Aboriginal Settlement concerning 
the pocket book of an Indigenous worker sent to a different location to work (Julia, 2009).. 
 
The most frequent abuse by employees was failure to pay the full cash wage entitlement.  Cash wages 
were regularly withheld for years or never paid.  A Western Australian government inquiry found the 
government knew about and condoned this (Skyring & Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia, 
2006).  Extant research indicates this occurred throughout Australia with the knowledge of all 
governments (Kidd, 2007).  In the words of Indigenous worker Marjorie Woodrow who lived in a remote 
location on a cattle property: 
Our money was paid into the government.  We never saw no money, any money.  We 
never even saw pocket money.  It is in our files that we were paid pocket money to spend.  
I was 136 miles out of town.  How could you have pocket money to spend when you were 
that far out, for 2½ years on a property (Woodrow & Decker, 2006)? 
Workers could be short-changed, not given cash owed, or paid in supplies rather than cash (Franks, 
2006).  Some employers gave their Indigenous employees credits to a local store in lieu of cash wages.  
Indigenous workers then went to the store and bought supplies against their store credit.  Workers did 
not see the accounting records for this system so did not know whether their spending was within or 
exceeded their store credit limit (Kidd, 2007).  Generally, cash wages were so low that workers became 
in debt to the store with the level of interest on the debt being determined by the store owner (Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Workers could remain permanently in 
debt or be forced to work overtime without pay in exchange for their employer compensating the store, 
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but even those who worked additional hours without pay remained in debt, however frugally they lived 
(Woodrow & Decker, 2006).  Kidd (2006) found that Indigenous workers were paid less than their white 
counterparts, did more menial tasks and provided a cheap labour source so employers had a vested 
interest in Indigenous workers remaining in debt.  Indigenous workers could work more unpaid than 
paid hours per week (Kidd, 2007).  In 1945, the Queensland government mandated that wives of 
Indigenous pastoral workers were to work 12 hours per week without payment (Kidd, 2007).  
Government control over Indigenous workers, their wages and their families was absolute. 
Governments regularly imposed temporary levies on the cash component of Indigenous wages 
(Brennan, 2006).  We could find no legislation authorising these levies.  They were generally described 
as being for some type of Indigenous welfare fund (Brennan, 2006; Hartland et al., 2009).  In 1957, the 
Queensland government levied a tax of 2 shillings per week on all Indigenous workers to pay for the 
Cairns Aerial Ambulance.  Labelled as a “voluntary” contribution, it was compulsorily deducted from the 
pocket money of Indigenous workers even though most were ineligible to use the Cairns Aerial 
Ambulance.  The tax continued until 1966, yielding approximately $35,000 per annum (Kidd, 2007).  
This amount is stated in 1966 dollars.  Using the Reserve bank of Australia inflation calculator, when 
adjusted to 2016 Australian dollars using share of GDP, this amounts translates to $2,315,000 per 
annum.  
There were frequent abuses and maladministration of the component of wages held in government trust 
accounts.  Before the 1930s, individual trust accounts existed for each worker, held by local banks.  
Local protection boards appointed a controller to manage these accounts who was usually a police 
officer or local government official (Queensland Public Interest Law Clearing House Incorporated, 
2006).  Local controllers were paid (Government of Victoria, 2009).  There were no Indigenous 
controllers (Franks, 2006).  Local controllers did not receive any training in financial management nor 
were they briefed about their legal responsibilities as agents of the trustee (Queensland Public Interest 
Law Clearing House Incorporated, 2006).  While legislation allowed reasonable costs for management 
to be deducted from trust accounts, this was done without knowledge of the Indigenous wage-earners 
(Gray & Casten Centre for Human Rights Law, 2006).  Failing to notify Indigenous trust account holders 
of transactions involving their accounts was a breach of the protection acts (Queensland Department 
of Health and Home Affairs, 1945; Queensland Public Interest Law Clearing House Incorporated, 2006).  
Although records are unclear, it appears that sometimes, protection boards determined local controllers’ 
fees but frequently, local controllers determined their own fees (Brennan, 2006).  Anecdotal evidence 
from Indigenous workers suggests fraud by controllers was widespread.  Indigenous testimonies to 
government inquiries report that police officers had new cars and other new items within a year of 
becoming local controllers, the inference being that they were taking money illegally from Indigenous 
trust accounts (Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Misuse of 
funds was so common that in Queensland, over half of the Indigenous wages in trust funds in local 
banks was taken illegally by local controllers for their own use (Kidd, 2006). 
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Indigenous workers could neither deposit to, nor withdraw from, their trust accounts.  Local controllers 
approved and made all transactions.  Controllers kept a separate ledger card for each account showing 
deposits, withdrawals and the account balance (Austin, 1992; Butler, 2006).  There is no evidence that 
ledger cards were reconciled with bank statements (Kidd, 2006).  Without reconciliations, there was 
increased opportunity for controllers to make fraudulent withdrawals or take unconscionable fees for 
managing the Indigenous accounts.  Monthly summaries listing account names and balances were 
prepared by controllers and submitted to local protection boards.  Protection boards submitted annual 
summaries to Regional Controllers.  Cumulative totals were then submitted to the Controller of 
Aboriginal Affairs.  There is no evidence that protection boards checked the list of account balances 
they received each month against either ledger cards or bank statements.  There is no evidence of 
department officials checking totals submitted to them (Kidd, 2009).  These totals were not reported to 
Parliament even though this was required under government trust management regulations (Gray, 
2008). 
Contemporary government inquiries indicate that protection boards knew of the frauds but rarely 
instigated corrective action (Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  
Despite legislative requirements, local controllers’ records were rarely audited.  Archival evidence 
suggests that in the 1930s, the Queensland government rejected audits as too costly even though 
government officials knew fraud by local controllers and protection boards was rife (Kidd, 2006).  It is 
unclear from documentary evidence if, or when, this view changed (Queensland Government, 2010). 
Between 1938 and 1940 all jurisdictions introduced centralised systems to manage Indigenous trust 
money.  Individual bank accounts were consolidated in local banks, or transferred into accounts held in 
capital cities.  Indigenous wage-earners were not informed of this change (Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Local controllers continued to keep individual ledger 
cards so from the perspective of local controllers and Indigenous workers, the system seemed 
unchanged.  With account centralisation, local protection boards no longer received monthly balances 
or forwarded annual details to State controllers.  Instead, government departments managing 
Indigenous affairs used the bank account balance, with no additional checks, as the correct balance of 
Indigenous trust money (Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006), which 
lessened the probability that the misuse of trust money by local controllers would be detected and meant 
that the integrity of the system depended on the honesty of local financial controllers (Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Although administratively expedient, 
centralisation did not serve the interest of the Indigenous population.  In Queensland, the system of 
local financial controllers was also centralised.  All financial controllers were located in the capital city 
of Brisbane.  Simultaneously, over 4000 trust accounts were consolidated and transferred to Brisbane.  
As with all changes, Indigenous wage-owners were not informed.  To access money, Indigenous wage-
earners had to travel to a financial controller in Brisbane and request a withdrawal.  This process 
presented numerous challenges.  A micro-history from Palm Island provides an example of some of the 
challenges. 
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Palm Island, also called Bwgoolman, is 724 miles (or 1170 kilometres) from Brisbane, off the 
Queensland coast, in the Great Barrier Reef.  As with other parts of Australia, the local protection board 
allocated work to the Indigenous population of Palm Island.  Men were sent to work on remote cattle 
properties on mainland Queensland.  Before centralisation of trust accounts, workers on leave had to 
seek permission from their local financial controller if they wanted money from the trust account.  There 
are many recorded instances of the workers being refused permission to travel home when on leave 
which prevented them accessing money.  When bank accounts were centralised and access required 
authorisation from a controller located in Brisbane, records indicate that local protection boards 
invariably denied a request to travel to Brisbane.  The most common reason for refusing a travel request 
was that, at the time of making the request, the Indigenous worker did not have sufficient cash for the 
return trip to Palm Island (Queensland Government, 2010) even though the worker would have cash 
for the return trip after the withdrawal.  It was a breach of the protection acts to deny Indigenous wage-
earners access to their trust money.  The legislation gave Indigenous workers no legal recourse. 
Even though trust money was the property of Indigenous workers, all jurisdictions gave local controllers 
the power to decide whether Indigenous workers would be permitted access to their own money 
("Aboriginals Ordinance (Clth)," 1918; Queensland Government, 2010).  When someone wanted a 
withdrawal from their account, controllers assessed capacity to manage money.  Figure 4 is an example 
of a form completed by a controller assessing capacity.  There is no evidence of financial controllers 
receiving any training or guidance on how to make this assessment (Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4: Form completed by local controller assessing Indigenous capacity.  The controller would only withdraw 
money if he made a favourable capacity assessment (Korff, 2012). 
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Based on the controller’s assessment, permission could be refused ("Aborigines Protection Act (NSW)," 
1909; Brennan, 2006; Healey et al., 2006; "Northern Territory Aboriginals Act (SA)," 1910; Queensland 
Government, 2010; Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Thus, 
local controllers whose financial competence was not assessed before appointment were assessing 
the financial competence of others.  Indigenous workers were often asked to place a thumb-print or 
cross on the assessment form rather than signing, then lack of a written signature became legally 
binding proof of financial incapacity (Brennan, 2006; Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Instead of using incapacity as a trigger for more careful and thorough 
management of Indigenous financial affairs or to educate the Indigenous population, it served to 
distance Indigenous workers from control over their financial affairs.  Controllers took advantage of the 
high level of illiteracy and innumeracy in the Indigenous population.  In the words of Indigenous 
Australian Arnold Franks: 
If you could not read too well and you had to sign a paper over for £1,000, you needed to 
sneak someone in with you, some young fella [sic] who could read a bit, or you could come 
out with 10/-.  If you are like me, with no schooling, you do not know (to check you were 
not being defrauded) (Franks, 2006). 
The testimony of Indigenous Australian, Yvonne Butler, is indicative of the blatant misuse of trust 
money.  Workers were often employed in locations where access to their money was impossible (Kidd, 
2007).  Butler’s father was forcibly removed from home and sent to work on a cattle station in a remote 
location.  He was allowed to go home two days each year to see his family.  Such a scenario was not 
unusual (Kidd, 2006).  Butler’s father could only access his bank account through the local controller 
near his home.  He could not authorise his family to access the account because legislation gave access 
only to the person who had earned the money.  When he returned home, there was a two mile (3.2 
kilometres) walk to reach the local courthouse to request money from the local controller.  According to 
Butler (2006, p. 1): 
On 15 November 1955 my father had supposedly withdrawn seven times in that one day.  
That is unbelievable because any Aboriginal person that lived under that protection act 
was lucky enough to get one withdrawal.  The first entry was for £4 11/-.  Then the 
withdrawals were for £3 6/-, £13 10/- 3d and £5 11/-.  The last withdrawal on that day was 
for £25 8/- 6d.  That was a lot of money in those days.  I even saw a withdrawal for £91.  
My sisters’ provident fund accounts - they were 12 and 13 years old - had withdrawals of 
£6 15/-. 
Although the controller’s unauthorised transactions were illegal, he was never sanctioned and the stolen 
amounts were not reimbursed.  Yvonne Butler was later removed from her family and taken to a city 
hospital, suffering from malnutrition.  Her mother, who worked ten hours a day to feed her family, did 
not have enough money to travel to the hospital to visit her daughter and was not allowed to access 
money from her husband’s account because the Indigenous population was not permitted to hold joint 
bank accounts.  Before her hospitalisation, Yvonne Butler and her sisters had unpicked threads from 
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their dresses to make fishing lines in an attempt to catch fish for food.  Many other Indigenous families 
have similar stories of extreme hardship because they were denied access to the money held in trust 
on their behalf (Kidd, 2007).  A 1923 Queensland Public Service report indicated that approximately 
half of all transactions were falsified yet no action has ever been taken (Gray & Casten Centre for 
Human Rights Law, 2006).  Although the 1923 report found that the lack of internal controls contributed 
to the large volume of falsified transactions, no controls were introduced and fraud continued unabated 
(Gray & Casten Centre for Human Rights Law, 2006). 
Trust money abuses were not confined to private sector employers.  There are recorded irregularities 
concerning money placed in trust for Indigenous wage-earners in government employment.  Indigenous 
Australian and Olympic gold medallist in athletics, Cathy Freeman, uncovered a history of financial and 
social abuses against members of her family when researching her genealogy for popular television 
series Who do you think you are?  Her great-grandfather was in the Army.  He had been allowed to 
serve in the First World War only because he had a European parent, which meant he was considered 
non-Indigenous for military enlistment.  However, he was considered Indigenous by his local protection 
board so his wages were controlled under the protection acts.  At law, as a serving member of the Army, 
his wages should have been divided between money given to him as cash in hand and money placed 
in a government trust account for his family.  Freeman discovered that, as an Indigenous person, her 
grandfather’s pay was split between cash wages and an amount held in trust.  The trust money was 
never received by his family, causing considerable hardship.  Freeman discovered the sequestered pay 
was termed “settlement tax” and her family was told it covered food rations, although they were never 
given food rations and provided their own food throughout the war (Manning, 2008).  It is ironic that 
Freemen’s great-grandfather could risk death serving his country during wartime but his country could 
not serve him and his family by according them basic rights available to non-Indigenous Australians.  
Indigenous testimony to government inquiries suggests that Indigenous wage-earners were unaware 
that governments illegally used trust money and the interest earned from that money (Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006) but it is difficult to follow the financial 
trail in this area: many records were never prepared (Greer, 2006). 
Where accounting records do exist, there are often glaring contradictions.  The 1990 balance of a 
Queensland welfare fund, comprised exclusively of trust money that had been transferred in breach of 
legislation, varies from $2.6 million to zero dollars, depending which records are accessed (Queensland 
Government, 2010).  All governments treated trust money as a fund available for use as they pleased, 
frequently transferring it between accounts without explanation (Kidd, 2006).  From 1925 to 1935, the 
Queensland Government used Indigenous wage money to reduce its budget deficit.  From 1925 to 
1945, varying amounts were transferred into an Aboriginal Protection of Property Account.  Fifty per 
cent of this account was used for the general operations of government including establishing and 
running a sawmill neither owned by nor employing Indigenous Australians (Kidd, 2006).  It is impossible 
to trace the remaining money because there is no documentary trail.  Abuses went unchecked because, 
for a period of almost fifty years, trust fund accounts were not audited despite the legislative requirement 
of an annual audit (Queensland Government, 2010). 
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All jurisdictions used language that obfuscated: governments described their transfers of Indigenous 
trust money as being for wages, purchase of stores and relief of natives.  Although terminology was 
used to suggest the money was applied to Indigenous welfare, any use by government of this money 
was illegal.  In reality, the trust money was used to lower government budget deficits (Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Trust money was regularly transferred 
into accounts specified as being for Indigenous welfare, emergency relief or maintenance of property.  
Queensland regularly transferred money into an Aborigines’ Welfare Fund stated to be for “Christmas 
cheer” for those living on Indigenous settlements, even though no money was spent in this way 
(Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  All jurisdictions appear to 
have maintained an equivalent fund with up to 10% of Indigenous wages transferred to it without the 
knowledge or consent of Indigenous owners. 
Throughout Australia, trust money was used to pay the cost of removing Indigenous families without 
their consent to government-designated Indigenous settlements, and removing Indigenous children 
from their parents to institutional care or foster homes where they would be taught to “be white” (National 
Inquiry into the separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, 1997; 
Uniting Church in Australia, 2010).  This practice continued until 1966.  The financial trail of these money 
movements is obscure and incomplete. 
In this section, the State of Queensland may appear to have been singled out.  This is not our intention: 
the abuses occurred throughout Australia.  Queensland has only featured in the examples because it 
is the only government with any semblance of accounting records on the management of Indigenous 
wages.  Government inquiries have found that in most cases, there are no records and in some cases, 
governments have refused to disclose whether records exist or produce them to facilitate the inquiry, 
even though it has been instigated by that government (Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs (Senate), 2006).  Despite the prevalence of illegality and maladministration, we 
do not suggest that everyone connected with the financial management of Indigenous wages was 
corrupt.  We do not suggest that all Indigenous money was mismanaged or dealt with fraudulently, or 
that there was a total failure to audit.  There are recorded instances of protection board officers who 
sought to alleviate the wrongs perpetrated against Indigenous communities but their concerns were 
ignored by government (Jebb, 2002).  Some trust account audits were conducted, albeit on an irregular 
basis and varying in audit scope: in the Queensland Audit Report 1964-65, the Auditor-General noted 
that the lack of supervision over trust account transfers and pocket money payments (State of 
Queensland, 1964-65).  Similar concerns had been raised irregularly since at least 1900 but ignored 
(Beattie, 2002).  All audit findings have been preserved and indicate that action has never been taken 
in response to adverse audit findings concerning the management of Indigenous wages (Kidd, 2007).  
In addition, there is no recorded instance of the known misuse of funds triggering an investigation, nor 
is there any known instance of a fraud being fully investigated (Brennan, 2006). 
Despite evidence of isolated attempts for proper management of Indigenous wages, overall, the 
management of Indigenous wages illustrates a failure of accounting mechanisms of such proportion 
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that this failure has featured in every State and Federal government inquiry into stolen wages.  In the 
following section, we consider how this case study enhances our understanding of the nexus between 
accounting and stigma. 
Conclusion 
Choudhury (1988, p. 550) discusses the importance of focusing on the areas where we expect to find 
accounting but instead, find negative spaces, stating that “the aim of knowledge is not only to systemize 
that which exists but to rationalize that which does not”.  Accounting for stolen wages is an example of 
negative space where accounting functions were not performed, or not performed as we might expect.  
In an organisational context, Choudhury (1988) described a situation where accounting controls are in 
place but are not followed, creating negative space.  The protection acts did not create a negative 
space.  They contained a detailed regulatory framework for the recording, reporting, communicating 
and auditing of financial information.  It was the failure to implement the regulatory framework that 
created a negative space. 
From a contemporary perspective, it is difficult to understand how successive governments of varying 
political persuasion, in jurisdictions throughout Australia, could disregard legislatively-mandated 
accounting practices over a period of 75 years.  We should qualify this comment: we do not suggest 
That there was a complete failure of accounting mechanisms.  However, government inquiries have 
identified a systematic failure of a magnitude that impacted directly on the Indigenous population by 
contributing to denying them access to money lawfully earned and ignoring, or condoning, 
maladministration and fraud at all levels of the system established to manage Indigenous workers and 
their wages (Government of Victoria, 2009; Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
(Senate), 2006).  
If the immorality of this failure is put aside “to rationalize that which is not” (Choudhury, 1988, p. 550), 
these accounting failures illustrate the complex, and often symbiotic, relationship between accounting 
and stigma.  We do not suggest that accounting failures caused the stigmatisation of Australia’s 
Indigenous population or Indigenous poverty.  However, in the social climate of deeply entrenched and 
ongoing stigmatisation of the Indigenous population, the failure to meet legislatively mandated 
accounting requirements appears to have been largely ignored or condoned. 
The adverse impacts of past impoverishment continue to be felt in Indigenous communities throughout 
Australia (Clark, 2000).  If the accounting requirements of the protection acts had been followed, the 
Indigenous population would not have suffered financial hardship to the same degree.  They would still 
have been economically vulnerable, because Indigenous workers were paid less than non-Indigenous 
workers, had no choice of employment and rarely had the schooling needed for higher paying jobs.  
However, financial maladministration and fraud would not have been factors contributing to Indigenous 
poverty. 
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Thus, accounting failure supported, and contributed to, Indigenous poverty and its visible signs, such 
as children suffering malnutrition and makeshift shelters for homes (Cass, 1985; Howard, 1982).  The 
visible signs of poverty provided a justification for ongoing Indigenous control, euphemistically termed 
“protection” (Elder, 2003).  The failure of accounting mechanisms, by exacerbating Indigenous poverty, 
contributed to the economic and social gap between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous “white” 
population, and the visible signs of this gap, occasioned by Indigenous poverty, reinforced that the 
Indigenous population was the Other in a society where non-Indigenous interests determined power 
structures and constructions of normal and acceptable within Australian society (Lattas, 1997). 
Indigenous Australians were not stigmatised for their poverty per se but for being the Other (Paradies, 
2005; Rowley, 1971).  However, poverty forced the Indigenous population to live in circumstances that 
supported the negative stereotype of, and confirmed racist beliefs about, the Indigenous population 
(Augoustinos, Ahrens, & Innes, 1994), reinforcing that stigmatisation of the Indigenous population was 
acceptable.  Indigenous stigmatisation continues in Australia: societal stigma necessitates a shift in 
thinking that occurs slowly over many generations (Padilla & Perez, 2003). 
Extant research on the nexus between accounting and stigma has considered examples where 
accounting is present (Miley & Read, 2016; Ó hÓgartaigh et al., 2012; Walker, 2008), but our research 
suggests that examining accounting absence can also enhance our understanding of the complex 
relationship between accounting and stigma.  Though accounting failure caused circumstances that 
supported the ongoing stigmatisation of the Indigenous population, the stigma would not have ended 
from the simple expedient of an accounting presence in the management of stolen wages because the 
stigma was grounded in entrenched social factors (Elkin, 1964), not accounting failure.  Accounting 
failure was not only a contributing factor: it was also a symptom of Indigenous stigmatisation. 
Accounting failure in regard to Indigenous wages must be understood as embedded in a larger complex 
of exclusion and harm towards the Indigenous population.  By locating accounting within this broader 
social context, we do not attribute less power to accounting than has been recognised in other research 
(Riccaboni, Giovannoni, Giorgi, & Moscadelli, 2006).  We merely acknowledge that accounting can 
operate as part of a complex, stigmatising power dynamic.  As with all power dynamics, it is fluid and 
changeable, as shown by examples where the integration of Indigenous peoples has led to cultural 
assimilation and self-determination (Chew & Greer, 1997) rather than continuing cycles of extreme 
poverty and abuse. 
The prevailing non-Indigenous “white” view throughout the period covered by this research was that 
Indigenous Australians were intractable, would never improve in response to white “protection” and that 
money spent on their welfare was wasted money (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2007).  There 
continues to be a view in Australia that Indigenous Australians are irredeemable and money spent on 
them is money wasted, and this view continues to lead to Indigenous Australians being blamed for their 
circumstances and stigmatised (Choo, 1990; A. Pedersen, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004; A. 
Pedersen, Dudgeon, Watt, & Griffiths, 2006).  By constructing Indigenous Australians as at fault for 
their circumstances, white Australia can more easily continue a discriminatory rhetoric towards the 
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Indigenous population.  For Indigenous Australians, capitalism has been totalitarianism: even the 
reclassification of wages as welfare money (Kidd, 2006) supported a racist rhetoric, hiding the insidious 
controls that brought Indigenous people into the capitalist machine. 
Falk (2001) identified two types of stigma.  Existential stigma refers to exclusion of people because of 
conditions they have not chosen, such as ethnicity, age or gender.  Achieved stigma covers situations 
when people have contributed in some way to their own exclusion, such as exclusion due to criminal 
conviction or intentional anti-social behaviour.  The Indigenous population suffered existential stigma 
due to race and because of, inter alia, accounting failure, an appearance of financial incompetence was 
constructed that led to achieved stigma.  Accounting failure contributed to the permanent denial to 
Indigenous workers of their full wage payment yet until the 1970s, these failures remained hidden.  What 
was visible was a population segment who appeared to be earning money and receiving government 
welfare but continued to live in abject poverty. 
In the case of stolen wages, accounting failure was not absolute but with inadequate records, it is difficult 
to assess accurately the magnitude of that failure.  That the failure was not absolute suggests that 
accounting presence and accounting absence may be at opposite ends of a spectrum rather than in a 
dichotomous relationship, suggested in extant research (Catasús, 2008; Choudhury, 1988) and if so, it 
may complicate in future research the process of trying to un-parcel the relationship between accounting 
and stigma.  Irrespective of government intent, restricting the flow of money is a savage control in a 
capitalist society where money is a critical medium of exchange and essential for living. 
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1 Stockmen are men who work caring for cattle on a large pastoral property-holding, known in 
Australian vernacular as a “property” or “station”.  The American equivalent of the stockman is the 
cowboy and the equivalent to the property is the ranch. 
2 Nugget is the brandname of a well-known shoe polish. 
                                                     
